07 Apr A Written Agreement To Commit A Criminal Act Is An Example Of A
The husband and wife are not guilty of conspiracy if they are the only parties to the agreement. The same is true for civilian partners. A woman can conspire with her husband, contrary to the criminal law of 1977, if, knowing that her husband was involved in a conspiracy with other people to commit an illegal act, she agreed with him to join this conspiracy, despite the fact that the only person with whom she entered into the contract was her husband R v Chrastny 94c. App R. 283, CA. The agreement cannot be a purely intellectual operation; it must include written words or deeds or other open acts. If the accused regrets and resigns immediately after the contract is concluded, they are still guilty of an offence. The removal of it can only be reduced: R. v. Gortat and Pirog  Crim.L.R.
648. As with the liability for complicity, the acquittal or non-prosecution of a party to the conspiracy does not absolve a co-conspirator of criminal responsibility in many states (Tex. Penal Code, 2011). In addition, a co-conspirator does not need to know all the other conspirators to be brought to justice as a member of the conspiracy (Neb). Rev. Ann. Stat., 2011). As long as the conspiracy accused knows that there are other conspirators, Mens rea is present for conspiracy. As the Model Criminal Code states: “[i]f a person guilty of conspiracy… knows that a person with whom he has conspired to commit a crime has conspired with another person or person to commit the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with that other person or person, whether or not he knows his identity” (Model Criminal Code No.
5.03, para. 2). Large-scale conspiracies, such as smuggling plots or illegal firearms, can lead each member to share criminal responsibility for conspiracy and any separate conspiracy transaction. A conspiracy is an agreement in which two or more people agree to enforce their criminal system, the agreement is precisely the criminal act itself: Mulcahy v. The Queen (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 306; R v Warburton (1870) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 274; A. v.
Tibbits and Windust  1 K.B. 77 with 89; A. v. Meyrick and Ribuffi, 21 Cr.App.R. 94, CCA. Although summary offences cannot be criminally attempted under Section 1 of the CAA 1981, the summary offence provisions sometimes lead to consistent facts.